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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT BERRETT, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) Supreme Court No. 
vs. ) Court of Appeals No. 
) 910215-CA 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN ) 
RAILROAD, ) Priority No. 16 
Defendant/Petitioner. ) 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Petitioner, The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 
requests the Supreme Court to exercise its power of supervision 
to review two issues: 
1. Is a trial court's discretion in making a case 
management decision to exclude evidence limited to cases of 
"possible contempt" under Utah R.Civ.P. 26 and 37, as the Court 
of Appeals held, rather than governed by the broader standards of 
Utah R.Civ.P. 16 and the trial courts' inherent powers? 
2. Where there is no proffer of evidence excluded by 
a trial court case management ruling, is the burden on the 
objecting party, as the Court of Appeals' decision requires, 
(rather t}ian on the proponent of the evidence) to establish what 
effect the evidence may have had on the result at trial? 
-1-
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (the 
"Opinion") issued on April 3, 1992. It was published at 184 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 49 (4/21/92). A copy is attached as Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION 
A. On April 3, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision was filed. 
B. No orders concerning a rehearing or extensions of 
time within which to petition for certiorari have been requested 
or made. 
C. Petitioner believes the respondents do not intend 
to file a cross-petition. 
D. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1992). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a 
scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made 
on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial 
conference, if a party or a party's attorney is 
substantially unprepared to participate in the 
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails 
to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or 
its own initiative, may make such orders with regard 
thereto as are just, and among others, any of the 
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu 
of or in addition to any other sanctions, the court 
shall require the party or the attorney representing 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of any noncompliance with this rule, including 
attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
-2-
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Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion 
to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was 
not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this action, the plaintiffs/respondents, landowners 
of the former town of Thistle, Utah (the "Landowners"), alleged 
that petitioner The Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad (the 
"Railroad"), through activities on its right-of-way at the base 
of an ancient landslide, caused that landslide to become 
activated, to move across the canyon below the Landowners' 
property and to cause flood damage to the Landowners. (Third 
Amended Complaint, R. 872). l Following trial from August 14 to 
29, 1989,2 the jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the 
Railroad and the Landowners appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (R. 1387, 1514.) By a 2 to 1 decision, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the result, finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion and committed prejudicial error in excluding 
testimony from an expert witness first identified by the 
Landowners fourteen days before trial. (Op. 9.)3 The Court of 
Appeals remanded the action for a new trial. (Op. 12.) 
lnR.^ refers to the Record on Appeal. "Op." refers to the 
Court of appeals' opinion. Page references immediately follow. 
2The Landowners filed this action in March 1986. Initially, 
trial was set for August 10, 1987; later this date was continued to 
February 21, 1989 and finally to August 14, 1989. (Op. 2.) 
3
 Judge Jackson's dissent, while expressing doubt whether the 
trial court had abused its discretion, stated that judgment should 
be affirmed because the Landowners failed to establish prejudicial 
error through a proffer of the expert's testimony. Judge Jackson 
rejected the majority's assertion that the Railroad had the burden 
to show the absence of prejudice. (Op. 13-15.) 
-4-
1. Introduction. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
result of a two-week trial, not because of any error at trial, 
but because of the pretrial exclusion of a late-named expert 
witness whose testimony is unknown to this day. In so reversing, 
the court erroneously (a) characterized the trial court's case 
management decision as a "discovery ruling," and (b) relieved the 
Landowner? of any obligation to proffer the excluded testimony. 
This decision so departs from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings that this Court should exercise its power of 
supervision to reinstate the jury's verdict and affirm the trial 
court's Judgment. Utah R.App.P. 46(c). 
2. Failure to Disclose Final Witness List. A June 23, 
1989, letter to the Landowners from the Railroad recounted the 
Railroad's difficulties in obtaining a "final" witness list. (R. 
748 [Appendix 2 hereto].) At a June 27, 1989, pretrial hearing 
to discuss final preparation for the August 14, 1989, trial, the 
Railroad advised the trial court that, while it had received on 
the previous Friday a list of twenty-five new witnesses proposed 
by the Landowners (in addition to thirty-two witnesses previously 
identified),4 the Landowners had failed to provide the Railroad 
with their final witness list. (Appendix 2 and R. 1543, 
pp. 6-8.)3 The Railroad requested that the Landowners be 
4
 See draft pretrial order, attached to Appellants' Brief as 
Appendix B. 
5
 R. 1543 is the transcript of the June 27, 1989, hearing and 
is provided at Appendix 3. 
-5-
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required to provide "a clear statement of who [they were] really 
going to call as witnesses so [the Railroad could] take whatever 
additional discovery might be appropriate. ..." (Appendix 3, 
p. 8.) 
The trial court inquired about disclosure of a final 
witness list. (Appendix 3, pp. 28-29.) When the Landowners' 
counsel announced that he needed forty days to contact the 
witnesses disclosed the previous Friday, the trial court 
responded: "You've got to talk to them a lot sooner than that, 
Mr. Young. I say, you'd better find out and talk to them within 
the next ten or fifteen days." (Appendix 3, p. 28.) The trial 
court then denied the Landowners' motion to continue of the 
trial. (Appendix 3, p. 28.) Finally, the trial court warned all 
counsel that each was "entitled to know who it is you are 
legitimately going to call. [S]o that you don't end up in 
surprises." (Appendix 3, p. 28.) Absent timely disclosure, "the 
only thing [the court] can do is to make an order they cannot be 
permitted to testify." (Appendix 3, pp. 28-29.) To accomplish 
this disclosure, the trial court directed the parties to agree on 
a form of pretrial order (which would contain a list of proposed 
witnesses) within ten days. (Appendix 3, pp. 25-26.) July 7, 
1989, the ten-day deadline set by the trial court, came and went 
without the filing of such an order. (Op. 2.) 
3. The Landowners' Witness List. On July 12, 1989, 
still facing a potential fifty-seven witnesses, the Railroad 
again sent a letter (the "July 12 Letter") to the Landowners 
-6-
requesting a "final" witness list. (Appellants' Brief, Appendix 
B.) The July 12 Letter asked for disclosure by August 1, 1989. 
Not until six days later, on July 19 or 20, 1989, did the 
Landowners finally commence an effort to locate (among other 
people) Dr. Shroder, a geologist who in 1967 had written about 
the Thistle slide. (R. 1551, p. 18.)6 
Then, on August 1, 1989, two weeks before trial, the 
Landowner? telecopied to the Railroad yet another witness list 
identifying seventy-eight new witnesses—five (including 
Dr. Shroder) to appear by live testimony and seventy-three to 
appear by deposition. (R. 1010.)7 The Railroad immediately 
filed a motion to strike each of the new witnesses* (Op. p. 3; 
R. 1010 ajid 1013 [Appendix 5].) 
4. The August 3, 1989, Hearing and Exclusion Ruling. 
At the August 3, 1989, hearing on the Railroad's motion to 
strike, counsel for the Landowners acknowledged the following: 
a. The Landowners had access to the papers of Dr. Shroder 
and had known his name "for a long time." (Appendix 4, 
pp. 28-29.) 
b. Having devoted his time and efforts to another case and 
having delegated trial preparation to another attorney, 
counsel for the Landowners "went to work on this case" 
only in July "because I was not ready. . . . " 
(Appendix 4, p. 13; Appendix 3, pp. 9, 15.) 
6
 R. 1551 is the transcript of the crucial August 3, 1989, 
hearing, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 4. 
7
 Tt>is brought the total number of witnesses that the 
Landowners had identified to 135—with 103 being named in the last 
six weeks before a scheduled two-week jury trial. (Appendix 3, pp. 
24-25.) 
-7-
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c. Counsel had only commenced his efforts to contact Dr. 
Shroder around "July 19th or 20th." (Appendix 4, p. 
18.) 
d. Dr. Shroder, in response to counsel's late July 
inquiries, had "made some preliminary conclusions," 
which counsel declined to disclose as being "work 
product," but represented to be "very beneficial" and 
"very helpful" to the Landowners' position. (Appendix 
4, p. 19.) 
e. "I don't honestly know the bottom line of all of [Dr. 
Shroder's] testimony. * * * [I]f his conclusions are 
reinforced . . . by the depositions and things I've now 
sent him, then I would definitely want to call him as a 
witness." (Appendix 4, pp. 29 and 19.) 
f. The August 1, 1989, list was still a "possiblfe] list" 
and not final. (Appendix 4, pp. 13 and 22.) 
At the close of the August 3 hearing the trial court 
noted that, on June 27, it had "made an order, directed from the 
bench," requiring submission of a pretrial order with the 
expected witness list within ten days of that date. (Appendix 4, 
p. 23.) Consistent with that "order," the trial court ruled that 
(a) persons not disclosed as witnesses by July 11, 1989,8 could 
not be called as witnesses, and (b) the deposition witnesses 
could be called provided all portions of deposition testimony to 
be used at trial were designated no later than August 9, 1989. 
(Appendix 4, pp. 23-26.) The trial court invited the Landowners 
to make tjieir record, but stated his view that the case could not 
8
 The written order subsequently entered lists July 7 (not 
11)—ten days after the June 27 hearing. (R. 1210-11; attached as 
Appendix 6.) Ultimately, after hearing the Landowners' explanation 
of each proposed witness, the trial court allowed the naming of all 
but two. (Appendix 4, pp. 15-20.) 
-8-
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go to trial if the August 1, 1989, witness list were to stand 
unmodified. (Appendix 4, pp. 29-32.) 
Before trial ended, the Landowners failed to offer any 
further information regarding Dr. Shroder's possible testimony. 
They did pot attempt to call Dr. Shroder as a witness either in 
their case-in-chief or on rebuttal. They made no proffer of his 
proposed testimony.9 
ARGUMENT 
I. A "POSSIBLE CONTEMPT" STANDARD DERIVED FROM DISCOVERY 
RULES DOES NOT LIMIT TRIAL COURT DISCRETION IN MAKING 
CASE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS. 
Without citation to the Record, the Court of Appeals 
denominates the proceedings resulting in the exclusion of 
witnesses as a "discovery" matter controlled by Utah R.Civ.P. 26 
and 37. (Op. 6, 8.)10 According to the Court of Appeals, these 
discovery rules prohibit "the imposition of a sanction" without 
an order that "'brings the offender squarely within possible 
9
 For instance, only after trial, at a hearing on a motion for 
new trial, did the Landowners first contend that Dr. Shroder was a 
"world-renowned geomorphologist." (Transcript of January 3, 1990, 
hearing, excerpted in Appendix 7, p. 8; R. 1563). Ostensibly 
quoting D(r. Shroder, the Landowners also first disclosed after 
trial a pprtion of his tentative opinions: "I warned him [sic] 
years ago that that railroad could cause a landslide in that area. 
In my article. And just whereas you've told me, Mr. Young, it 
sounds lijce they certainly were a cause. I hate to tell you that 
without more, so would you send me the information that you have." 
(Appendix 7, p. 7.) 
10
 Later in its opinion, the Court of Appeals appears to 
acknowledge this by recharacterizing the trial court's exclusion 
decision as "a case management decision under the rules of civil 
procedure" and the August 3, 1989 hearing as a "Pre-trial hearing." 
(Op. 8, 9 and 11.) 
-9-
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contempt of court.'" (Op. 6-7 citing Sexton v. Sugar Creek 
Packing Co., 38 Ohio App.2d 32, 311 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1973) 
(emphasis added). This holding is wrong. 
As the hearing transcripts reveal, the trial court's 
exclusion of witnesses was never a discovery issue. Rather, at 
all times the trial court acted under its inherent powers and 
Utah R.Civ.P. 16 to manage properly the action before it in 
preparation of trial. Because the Court of Appeals erroneously 
perceives the exclusion of Dr. Shroder as limited by the rules of 
discovery, its abuse-of-discretion analysis is flawed. 
A. The Trial Court Excluded Witnesses as a Case 
Management Decision. Docket management was the trial court's 
guiding concern as it addressed the Landowners' attempt to 
continue trial again and the Railroad's requests to learn the 
identity of witnesses: 
You can't imagine what this would do to this court's 
calendar to take two weeks now that I can't fill at 
this late date . . . what you've done is to put at 
least two weeks of the court's time that's going to be 
lost or wasted not necessarily wasted, I can find 
things to do. But it doesn't satisfy the public in 
getting their cases heard and taken care o f . . . . 
(Appendix 3, pp. 24-25.) 
And I'm telling you, in my view, it's too late. And 
that even though they give them an opportunity to 
depose [Mr. Shroder] next week, then [the Railroad,] 
they've got to get experts, they've got to get 
somebody, if they want to counter it, so that you don't 
have a reasonable opportunity to prepare your case, 
either side. It seems to me that this is something 
that ought to have been done a long time ago. 
(Appendix 4, p. 16.). 
-10-
At no time in any of the hearings or at trial was there 
any mention of Utah R.Civ.P. 26 as the basis for excluding Dr. 
Shroder. Thus, the Court of Appeals' extensive references to 
motions to compel/ contempt and Rule 26(f) (Op. 6-10) are 
inapposite; the trial court was managing its docket as Rule 16 
allows, not sanctioning discovery abuse. (Appendix 4, pp. 22-
31.) 
B» Rule 16 Governs Case Management Decisions. Trial 
courts have broad powers, both inherent and under Utah R.Civ.P. 
16(d), to manage their cases. See Committee Note of 1983 to 
Subdivision (f) of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure;11 In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) cert. denied, sub nom. Baker v. United States, 471 U.S. 
1014 (1985); Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 
1985) ("T}ie sanctions contained in Rule 16(f) were designed to 
punish lawyers and parties for conduct which unreasonably delays 
or otherwise interferes with the expeditious management of trial 
preparatipn"). Rule 16(d) incorporates by reference Rule 
37(b)(2) only to identify some of the orders available to a trial 
court; the standards by which those orders may issue in the 
pretrial context are governed by the flexible language of Rule 
16, not tjie more restrictive terms of the discovery rules 
employed by the Court of Appeals. 
11
 Attached as Appendix 8. The sanctions sub-section of the 
federal rule, which Utah Rule 16(d) tracks, is (f) rather than (d). 
-11-
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Under Rule 16, "[n]either contumacious attitude nor 
chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of 
sanctions." Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 
1988) (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16). As the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit12 has held: 
While on the whole Rule 16 is concerned with the 
mechanics of pretrial scheduling and planning, its 
spirit, intent and purposes is [sic] clearly designed 
to be broadly remedial, allowing courts to actively 
manage the preparation of cases for trial . . . We are 
not dealing here with the historic concept of contempt. 
We are not dealing with the traditional award of 
attorney's fees as an adjunct of success in litigation. 
Nor are we dealing with the defiant refusal of an 
attorney or party to comply with some order of the 
court, such as discovery. Instead, we are dealing with 
a matter most critical to the court itself: management 
of its docket and avoidance of unnecessary burdens on 
the tax-supported courts, opposing parties or both. 
In re Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440-41. Thus, the Court of Appeals 
erred by adopting a "possible contempt" standard (Opinion, p. 6) 
to govern trial court use of case management remedies—including 
witness preclusion. 
From this flawed premise the Court of Appeals 
erroneously implies that, absent some type of formal written 
order setting a deadline, the trial court has no power to exclude 
witnesses. (Op. 9.) Yet, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee 
has observed that "the violation of a court order" is necessary 
only to impose a contempt sanction under Rule 16. (Appendix 8.) 
12The Utah Supreme Court has previously sought guidance in 
applying Rule 16 from decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit construing the corresponding federal 
rule. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). 
-12-
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In any event, the Landowners have never claimed that the trial 
court's June 27 directive did not require witness disclosure or 
was somehow unenforceable.13 
The Court of Appeals also mistakenly concluded that the 
Landowners' counsel could rely on later dates referenced by the 
Railroad for the disclosure of witnesses14 and, by so doing, 
render the trial court's prior directive on disclosure a nullity. 
(Op. 8.) Even if the Railroad and Landowners had openly agreed 
to an extension, such an agreement, absent embodiment in a fully 
executed pretrial order, would have been ineffective. See Hollis 
v. United States, 744 F.2d 1430, 1432 (10th Cir. 1984) (in 
considering sanctions for failure to meet court-ordered deadline, 
an agreement between counsel to extend time for plaintiff to file 
an amended complaint "was ineffective").15 
13
 The Landowner's brief to the Court of Appeals (they filed 
no reply brief) entirely omits discussion of the trial court's June 
27 pretrial hearing. 
14
 The Court of Appeals concludes as a central element of its 
holding that the Landowners "relied upon [the] representations [in 
the July 12, 1989, Letter] and would be prejudiced by their 
withdrawal." (Op. 8.) This factual finding is unsupported. The 
Landowners did not contend at the time the trial court was 
considering the motion to strike that they "relied" on the contents 
of the July 12, 1989 Letter in delaying their efforts to contact 
Dr. Shroder and in failing to name witnesses by July 7, 1989. 
(Appendix 4.) Such reliance was impossible to establish given that 
the July 12 Letter dates five days after the trial court-imposed 
deadline had passed. (Appendix 3, pp. 25-26.) 
15
 Moreover, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the July 
12 Letter as a license to name unlimited numbers of new witnesses, 
if accepted by the trial court at the time, would certainly have 
required continuance of the trial in defiance of the trial court's 
express refusal on June 27, 1989, to grant such a continuance. 
-13-
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In summary, the trial court's instructions to counsel 
and its delineation of the consequences for failure to heed those 
instructions were unambiguous: failure to name witnesses would 
result in exclusion. (Appendix 3, pp. 28-29). Later, when faced 
with seventy-eight new witnesses (including Dr. Shroder) two 
weeks before trial, the trial court acted within its discretion 
in excluding witnesses not timely identified as the trial court's 
"order" directed. (Appendix 4, p. 23.) See Bertram v. Harris, 
423 P.2d 909, 916-18 (Alaska 1967) (no abuse of discretion under 
Rule 16 to exclude late-named witness in violation of order 
issued following pre-trial conference). Cf.., Child v. Salt Lake 
City, 575 P.2d 195, 197 (Utah 1978) (trial court's exercise of 
discretion should be disturbed only if it is "arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable"). The Court of Appeals' decision, 
which would fetter trial court discretion to cases of "possible-
contempt" in imposing case management sanctions, is simply wrong. 
See Ikerd, 852 F.2d at 1258-59. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY PRESUMING PREJUDICE IN ANY 
ERROR RESULTING FROM THE EXCLUSION OF DR. SHRODER, 
ERRONEOUSLY RELIEVED THE LANDOWNERS OF THE BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING PREJUDICE. 
Even if it could be said that the trial court abused 
its discretion (and it did not), the Court of Appeals misstated 
and misapplied the law of Utah regarding harmless error based on 
dicta in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints HOSP*, 7 Utah 2d 
39, 318 P.2d 330, 334 (1957). See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. To the 
extent the Court of Appeals relies upon Joseph to allocate to the 
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Railroad, the objecting party, the burden of establishing 
prejudicial error, this Court should expressly disavow or reverse 
that decision. (Op. 11.) 
The Court of Appeals correctly states the Rule 61 
standard: "If a trial court erroneously excludes a witness, we 
will reverse if the error was prejudicial to the substantial 
rights of a party." (Op. 4.) Further, the Court of Appeals 
agrees th^t the Landowners failed to make any proffer of Dr. 
Shroder's testimony from which a determination of prejudice might 
be made. (Op. 9.)16 Problems with the Court of Appeals' 
analysis £egin when the court concludes that the absence of a 
proffer is no problem because the exclusion of Dr. Shroder was 
not an "evidentiary ruling" and "[t]he failure to proffer . . . 
does not preclude an appeal of a case management decision." (Op. 
9.)17 As a consequence, the court reasons, one need only look 
to the Railroad's objection to Dr. Shroder's testimony for 
16
 Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals acknowledges that the 
Landowner? made no proffer of Dr. Shroder's testimony (Op. 9), it 
is puzzling to read subsequently: "Dr. Shroder's testimony . . . 
would have indicated that the slide was caused by defendant's cuts 
at the toe of the slide. . . ." (Op. 11.) Nothing in the Record 
supports this characterization of what Dr. Shroder might have said. 
17
 The Court of Appeals also places great emphasis on the 
Railroad'p supposed knowledge of Dr. Shroder's "geomorphological 
credentials," implying that the Railroad was somehow acquainted 
with what this witness might say. (Op. 11.) While it is 
undisputed that all parties knew of Dr. Shroder's early writings 
from almost the inception of the action, there was no mention of 
his "geomorphological credentials" (a characterization unverified 
to this day) until the hearing on the post-trial motion for new 
trial in January 3, 1990. (Appendix 7, p. 7.) In fact, neither 
the word "geomorphologist" nor its equivalent is to be found in any 
of the pretrial transcripts. 
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"[s]ome indication of the importance of the error . . . ." (Op. 
11 citing Joseph, supra.) Finding in this objection a reason to 
"doubt" the absence of prejudice, the Court of Appeals resolves 
that "doubt" in favor of the Landowners and finds that the 
exclusion of Dr. Shroder's testimony "was prejudicial." Id. 
This goes too far. 
The Court of Appeals disregards Rule 61 and its 
application as embodied in the procedures of Utah R.Evid. 
103(a)(2). The latter states: "Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which . . . excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected, and . . . the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer. . . . •• Utah R.Evid. 
103(a)(2). This provision is comprehensive; it applies to all 
rulings wjiich exclude evidence, without distinction between 
rulings premised on other rules of evidence and those premised on 
disregard for the court's pretrial directives. Utah R.Evid. 
103(a). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit iji United States ex rel. Leonard Tire Co. v. Ravco, Inc., 
616 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1980) (excluding documentary evidence), 
addressed this issue in an analogous context, remarking that; 
[T]he trial court could not have determined that any 
injustice would result, because [the defendant] did not 
tender the document, make an offer of proof, or provide 
the court with any indication of the document's 
importance. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). Further, since 
it is not part of the record, we also are unable to 
determine that the contents of the exhibit were so 
central to [the defendant's] case that its exclusion 
prevented examination of the real issues. . . . The 
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court's specific warning that dire consequences would 
follow the failure to submit an exhibit list makes us 
unsympathetic to [the defendant's] belated claim that 
its most critical piece of evidence was mistakenly 
overlooked during trial preparation. 
616 F.2d at 464. This is consistent with Utah decisions 
involving the essential nature of a proffer under Rule 103(a)(2) 
and its predecessor, Rule 5. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 
499-500 (Utah 1986); Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 
1243 (Utaji 1980); Downey State Bank v. Malor-Blakenev Corp., 578 
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978). 
The proffer has as its purpose to inform the appeals 
court sufficiently to make a determination whether, had the 
evidence peen admitted, "there is any reasonable likelihood that 
there would have been a different result at the trial." 
Bradford, 621 P.2d at 1243. There is no suggestion in the cases 
that the Rule 103 phrase "a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence" is so limited as not to include an exclusionary ruling 
based on non-disclosure of witnesses. 
The Court of Appeals' decision, which relies only on 
dicta frojn the 1957 Joseph case (Op. 10-11), is counterintuitive 
both as a fact conclusion and a procedural guide. The Railroad 
objected, not just to the testimony of Dr. Shroder, but to the 
testimony of all seventy-eight new witnesses. (Appendix 5.) 
Thus, there is no basis for the Court of Appeals' presumption 
that the Railroad's blanket objection transformed Dr. Shroder's 
undisclosed (and, to this day, universally unknown) proposed 
-17-
g:\wpl\l88\00001ddl.W51 
testimony into evidence that could materially affect the result 
at trial. 
In broader application, the Court of Appeals' rule 
results i:p. an absurdity. Under Rule 103(a)(1), the Railroad must 
object in order to preserve its rights and take an appeal. Yet, 
if the Railroad objects, the Court of Appeals now deems the 
objection an admission that the evidence could substantially 
effect the result at trial. (Op. 10-11.) "Doubt" as to the 
effect of the excluded evidence must now be resolved in favor of 
the proponent of the evidence. (Op. 11-12.) Therefore, to 
preserve its right of appeal, the Railroad is now required to 
take action that will ultimately render any error prejudicial and 
reversible. The only conceivable way for any objecting party to 
avoid this result would be to take a deposition and make its own 
proffer of the evidence it seeks to exclude. The rules do not 
mandate or intend such absurd results. 
The straightforward allocation of burden and 
responsibility outlined in Rule 103 is intended to avoid such 
dilemmas. The party resisting the offer of evidence has the 
burden, ijx the first instance under sub-section (a)(1), to object 
for the record. If the objection is sustained, then under sub-
section (£)(2) the offering party must make an offer of proof for 
the record. Neither party is presumed by its actions to have 
affirmed the position of the other or is called upon to preserve 
the evidejice for another. Only in this fashion is the appellate 
court left with an adequate record to consider on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Supreme Court should review 
these two important questions. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 1992. 
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